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ABSTRACT
This article explores the demand for soft, self-imposed commitment, and subsequent compliance
behaviour, using a framed field study in a higher education setting. We find a substantial soft
commitment demand and a remarkably high failure to comply with the chosen commitment.
Students are more likely to demand soft commitment if they expect the task to be more time-
consuming and their relative performance to be lower. Failure to comply is associated with
previous grade and personality traits. We find no evidence that soft commitment affects grades.
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I. Introduction
Procrastination is a pervasive phenomenon in the
workplace, in the household, in health care and in
the classroom. In higher education, procrastinating
study effort may lead students to fall behind, submit
assignments past their deadlines, and ultimately
graduate later and with lower grades and have
worse career prospects.
Students who are aware of their tendency to pro-
crastinate may decide to demand commitment to
restrict their future choices and thus mitigate future
procrastination. Commitment is defined ‘ hard’
when it cannot be broken or leads to real economic
penalties if broken, and ‘soft’ when it leads to pri-
marily psychological consequences, i.e. either purely
psychological costs or minor material costs (Bryan
and Nelson 2010). The key and interesting feature of
soft commitment is that it allows for both commit-
ment and flexibility. Thus, if effective, it may be a
more appropriate device for individuals who want to
restrict their future choices due to self-control pro-
blems, but value flexibility due to uncertainty about
the future (e.g. costs shocks).1 While, as further
discussed below, there is substantial evidence of stu-
dents’ demand for hard commitment, research on
soft commitment is still very limited.
In this article, we explore the demand for soft,
self-imposed commitment – in the form of early
deadlines, and subsequent compliance behaviour,
using a framed field study in a higher education
setting. In particular, we measure soft commit-
ment demand and compliance, study the charac-
teristics of the students who demand commitment
and those who break the chosen commitment, and
explore whether soft commitment improves
grades.
Our sample consists of first-year university stu-
dents enrolled in a course which involves an assessed
take-home essay to be submitted by a deadline. As
part of our study, the students were asked to com-
plete a brief survey, which automatically entitled
them to a lottery ticket with a negligible expected
value. The survey asked the students to choose an
individual deadline for the submission of the essay,
which could be either the official deadline or an
earlier date. If students subsequently failed to com-
ply with the self-chosen early deadline, their lottery
ticket would become invalid. Hence, commitment
was soft: it could be broken, and breaking it involved
primarily psychological costs and a negligible mate-
rial cost. As early submission did not give the stu-
dents any material benefit, they had no reason to
commit to an early deadline other than the willing-
ness to avoid procrastination.
More than 43% of the students self-chosen an
early soft deadline, but the deadline chosen was on
CONTACT Claudia Cerrone cerrone@coll.mpg.de Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany
1Amador, Werning and Angeletos (2006) and Galperti (2015) study the optimal provision of commitment to individuals who value both commitment and
flexibility.
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average only on 1.90 days earlier than the official
one. Thus, the commitment demand was substantial,
but the commitment chosen was not strong. Almost
74% of the students who demanded commitment
subsequently failed to comply with it.
Students are more likely to demand commitment
if they expect the task to be more time-consuming
and their relative performance to be lower. They are
more likely to break the chosen commitment if they
got a lower grade in the previous assignment, and if
they are more extrovert and less emotionally stable.
The comparison of our treated cohorts with two
subsequent untreated cohorts provides no evidence
that soft commitment affects grades.
Our study relates to the literature on voluntary
commitment in the form of self-chosen deadlines.
Using a sample of 99 professionals enrolled in an
executive education course at MIT, Ariely and
Wertenbroch (2002) (henceforth AW) find that indi-
viduals self-impose intermediate deadlines even if
breaking such deadlines leads to a grade penalty.2
The key difference between our study and AW’s
study is that, due to the grade penalty, the commit-
ment they offer is hard. Moreover, their grade pen-
alty crucially depends on students’ ability and
personality, which raises the concern that each indi-
vidual’s cost from breaking the deadline is unknown
and variable. Bisin and Hyndman (2014) find a
strong demand for self-imposed deadlines –
although that does not increase task completion
rates. Their study differs from ours because their
deadlines are hard, the task is artificial (alphabetiz-
ing lists of words) and the rewards are guaranteed.
Our work also contributes to the emerging litera-
ture on soft commitment. In a recent paper
Himmler, Jaeckle and Weinschenk (2017) offer uni-
versity students the possibility to sign a nonbinding
agreement where they declare that they will adhere
to the exam schedule recommended by the univer-
sity. They find that this soft commitment device
leads students to take and pass more exams, but
does not affect their grade point average. Our study
differs from theirs as our soft commitment device is
deadline-based.
Finally, by relating personality traits to soft com-
mitment demand and compliance, our work contri-
butes to the literature linking personality traits to
economic decisions, particularly self-control beha-
viour (Hurd et al. 2012).
II. Design
Our sample consists of first-year university students
in the School of Management at Royal Holloway
University of London, enrolled in a marketing
course that involves an assessed take-home essay to
be submitted by a deadline. The essay counts 60%
towards the final grade in the course. As part of our
in-class study, all the students were asked by their
‘seminar leaders’ (i.e. the teaching assistants in
charge of teaching the tutorials) to complete a brief
survey at the beginning of the class. Before complet-
ing the survey, the students were asked to sign a
consent form, as required by Royal Holloway
University’s ethical guidelines.3 The completion of
the survey automatically entitled the students to a
lottery ticket. The lottery’s prizes were Amazon vou-
chers and the expected value of a ticket was £5. The
survey asked each student to nominate an individual
deadline for submission of the essay, which could be
either the official deadline (which was about 6 weeks
after the date of the survey) or an earlier date. If
students subsequently failed to comply with the self-
chosen early deadline, their lottery ticket would
become invalid. Thus, by choosing the official dead-
line and adhering to it, students could secure their
lottery ticket. Since early submissions did not give
the students any grade advantage or other reward,
and all the essays would be graded after the official
deadline, they had no reason to self-impose an early
deadline other than their desire to avoid
procrastination.4
The survey also included questions about the Big
Five personality traits (the 10-item inventory by
Gosling, Rentfrow and Swann (2003)), demographic
characteristics (gender, age, parental education and
nationality), risk attitudes (the 10-item risk aversion
scale by Dohmen et al. (2011)), impatience, expected
2Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) also find that students’ performance is better under externally imposed, evenly spaced deadlines than self-imposed ones,
whereas Burger, Charness and Lynham (2011) find that externally imposed, intermediate deadlines lead to lower task completion rates.
3The full survey can be found at https://www.dropbox.com/s/h787sgqltysfj30/questionnaire.pdf?dl=0. The consent form can be found at https://www.
dropbox.com/s/ovz83b0etu03x5g/consent%20form.pdf?dl=0.
4The students knew that neither the seminar leader nor the course lecturer would be informed about their self-chosen deadlines and other answers in the
survey.
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number of hours of work on the essay and expected
own and average grade in the essay. The ratio between
the expected own grade and expected average grade is
used as a measure of relative confidence. At the end of
the day on which the survey was run, the students
were sent an email to remind them about their chosen
deadline, and encouraged to keep the email at hand.5
No further reminders were sent, to avoid that remin-
ders – rather than commitment – may drive students’
submission behaviour.
The in-class study was run in the same course in
two successive academic cohorts and the data were
pooled across the cohorts. After the study, we col-
lected the grades both in the current essay (grade 2)
and in the previous essay (grade 1), which was set
earlier in the term, had a very similar structure and
counted 40% towards the final grade in the course.
Due to ethical guidelines, we were not able to have a
control group not being offered the possibility to
self-impose early deadlines. However, we can com-
pare the grade distribution and failure to submit by
the official deadline of our two treated cohorts with
those of two untreated cohorts.
III. Results
Summary statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. As the stu-
dents filled in paper questionnaires and could not be
forced to answer all the questions, the number of
observations varies across questions.6 Little over half
of the students are female and the average age is 19.
Most students have at least one parent with a degree.
Nationalities are very diverse. The two academic
cohorts are of very similar size and are not significantly
different in terms of observable characteristics. The
students expect to work on average 26 h on the assign-
ment and to do on average 15% better than the average
student. Due to significant positive correlations
between extroversion and openness, and emotional
stability and conscientiousness, the Big Five were con-
densed to three categories to avoid multicollinearity.
The risk aversion scale was combined into three bands
– low (0–2), medium (3–6) and high (8–10). A small
group of students indicate high aversion to risk. A
simple binary indicator for being impatient was con-
structed based on whether the respondents would pre-
fer to receive their prize immediately after the draw or
rather wait one further week and receive a 20% larger
prize. Only a small group was identified as impatient.
Note that this simple indicator of impatience could
reflect either high exponential discounting or quasi-
hyperbolic discounting; we are unable to discriminate
between the two sources of impatience in the current
study. The average grade on the current assignment
was similar to the one completed earlier in the term.
More than 43% of the students committed to an
early deadline. Conditional on committing, the self-
chosen early deadline was on average 1.90 days
before the official one. Thus, commitment demand
is substantial as in AW, but the commitment chosen
is less severe than in AW, namely the chosen dead-
lines are less distant from the final possible deadline
than in AW. Henceforth, we will refer to students as
‘committed’ if they chose a deadline strictly earlier
than the official one, and ‘noncommitted’ otherwise.
Over 73% of the students who committed to an early
deadline subsequently failed to adhere to it. The self-
chosen early deadline was on average 2 days before
the official one among the students who failed to
comply, and 1.63 days before the official deadline
Table 1. Summary statistics.
N Mean SD N Mean SD
Age in years 261 19.33 2.66 Extroversion/open 258 5.02 0.96
Gender (male) 262 0.48 0.50 Emotionally stable/conscientious 258 5.08 0.91
Parent with degree 251 0.67 0.47 Agreeableness 259 4.38 0.91
British 254 0.27 0.45 Low risk taker 262 0.04 0.19
European/American 254 0.40 0.49 Medium risk taker 262 0.64 0.48
Asian/African 254 0.33 0.47 High risk taker 262 0.32 0.47
Second Academic cohort 263 0.49 0.50 Impatience (dummy) 250 0.05 0.22
Expected hours 251 25.71 22.99 Previous grade 259 62.25 10.16
Relative confidence 262 1.15 0.19 Current grade 256 61.60 10.65
Commit 263 0.43 0.50 Early deadline 109 1.90 1.65
5The students wrote their ID number on the survey, and their email address is given by their ID number, so their names and surnames were never known to
the experimenters.
6The students who did not fully complete the survey are not statistically different from the remaining sample in terms of relevant observable characteristics.
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among the students who complied. The percentage
of students who submitted the essay after the official
deadline was 15% among the committed and 9%
among the noncommitted.
Commitment demand
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the self-chosen
deadlines, where each deadline is scored on the base
of its distance from the official deadline (days in
advance). Over 57% of the students chose the official
deadline (0 days in advance). Of those committing to
an early deadline, the majority chose one day before
the official deadline.
Table 2 shows the correlates of the demand for
commitment using a linear probability model and
a probit model.7 For either model, Specification (1)
includes controls for gender, parental degree, pre-
vious grade, expected effort in terms of hours of
work and relative confidence, Specification (2)
adds personality measures, and Specification (3)
adds measures for willingness to take risk and
impatience. We find that students are more likely
to demand soft commitment if they expect the task
to be more onerous, in terms of how many hours
they expect to work on the task and how they
expect to perform relative to their peers. The linear
probability model shows that those who are less
willing to take risks are less willing to commit,
which is consistent with the fact that committing
imposes additional risk on the individual. While
having a positive coefficient, the effect of impa-
tience is not statistically significant. The coeffi-
cients of the demographic characteristics that
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Figure 1. Self-chosen deadlines.
Table 2. Demand for soft commitment.
Linear probability model Probit (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gender −0.022 −0.009 −0.011 −0.012 0.003 0.003
(0.065) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071) (0.074) (0.075)
Parents with degree 0.019 0.003 −0.020 0.017 −0.001 −0.030
(0.069) (0.074) (0.076) (0.075) (0.080) (0.099)
Previous grade −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Expected hours 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010)
Confidence −0.495*** −0.506*** −0.477** −0.596*** −0.615*** −0.595
(0.180) (0.184) (0.187) (0.215) (0.222) (1.160)
Extroversion/open 0.001 0.001 −0.004 −0.003
(0.036) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040)
Emotionally stable/conscientious 0.028 0.020 0.030 0.021
(0.037) (0.039) (0.041) (0.058)
Agreeableness 0.003 −0.000 0.005 −0.004
(0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.042)
Medium risk taker 0.390** 1.919
(0.174) (48.031)
High risk taker 0.398** 1.924
(0.181) (48.023)
Impatience (dummy) 0.214 0.241
(0.165) (0.493)
Other demographics and cohort Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 231 220 211 231 220 211
Notes: SEs in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
7We also explored a tobit model, but there was not enough variation in the commitment demand.
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were not significant in this or later stables are not
shown. Finally, different personality types do not
exhibit different propensity to commit.
Commitment compliance
In the full sample, over 37% of the students failed to
comply with their chosen deadline – whether an
early deadline or the official one. Of those who
committed to an early deadline, over 73% subse-
quently broke it. Table 3 shows the correlates of
the failure to comply with the chosen deadline.
Students who achieved a lower grade in the previous
assignment (and thus are less academically able) are
more likely to fail to comply. This is intuitive.
Students with lower academic ability are more likely
to be unable to finish the essay by an early deadline,
and thus need to keep working on the essay past the
soft, self-chosen deadline. Extroverts/open students
are more likely to fail to comply, while conscien-
tious/emotionally stable students are more likely to
comply. Finally, students with at least a parent with a
degree are more likely to fail to comply. The latter
may be due to the fact that these students tend to be
relatively more self-confident, and thus think that
they will be capable to work well on the essay at
the last minute. Alternatively, it may be due to an
income effect, as an expected earning of £5 is truly
negligible to students from high earning families.
While, as mentioned, the students were sent an
email on the day of the survey reminding them of
the deadline chosen and encouraging them to keep
this information at hand, we cannot exclude that
some students may have simply forgotten about the
chosen commitment.
Table 4 shows the correlates of the failure to comply
with the early, soft deadline. Thus, it repeats the
regressions in Table 3 in the subsample of students
who committed to a strictly early deadline. While the
much smaller sample size leads to lower statistical
power, the results in Table 3 are confirmed.
Grades
As mentioned, due to ethical guidelines, it was not
possible to have a control group that was not
offered the possibility to choose an early deadline.
Hence, we cannot estimate the causal impact of
soft commitment demand on grades. However,
we can compare our sample’s grades and compli-
ance with the official deadline, with those of two
untreated cohorts following our study.8 This is
Table 3. Failure to comply with the chosen deadline.
Linear probability model Probit (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gender 0.060 0.064 0.089* 0.059 0.061 0.079
(0.049) (0.050) (0.053) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Parents with degree 0.119** 0.102* 0.118** 0.116** 0.098* 0.117**
(0.051) (0.054) (0.057) (0.050) (0.052) (0.054)
Previous grade −0.005** −0.005** −0.005* −0.006** −0.006** −0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Expected hours 0.001 −0.000 −0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Confidence 0.054 0.112 0.087 0.110 0.146 0.127
(0.137) (0.136) (0.141) (0.132) (0.127) (0.134)
Extroversion/open 0.064** 0.072** 0.073*** 0.078***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026)
Emotionally stable/conscientious −0.059** −0.059** −0.068** −0.069**
(0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029)
Agreeableness 0.004 0.002 −0.006 −0.011
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027)
Medium risk taker −0.070 −0.058
(0.131) (0.132)
High risk taker −0.126 −0.102
(0.136) (0.133)
Impatience (dummy) 0.044 0.036
(0.123) (0.109)
Other demographics and cohort Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 231 220 211 231 220 211
Notes: SEs in parentheses.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
8Since the course was run for the first time when we ran our study, it is not possible to use earlier cohorts.
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illustrated in Figure 2. The first distribution (from
the left) illustrates the grades of the students who
were offered the opportunity to choose an early
deadline – the ‘treated cohorts on the treated
assignment’. The second distribution illustrates
the grades in the earlier essay for the same set of
students – the ‘treated cohorts on the untreated
assignment’. The final two distributions illustrate
the grades of the subsequent untreated cohorts in
the two assignments. We find no evidence that soft
commitment affects student grades. This is consis-
tent with recent evidence by Himmler, Jaeckle and
Weinschenk (2017), who find a positive effect of
soft commitment on the number of exams taken
and passed, but no effect on the grades.
Comparing the second and fourth distribution in
Figure 3, it can be noted that there was no selection
into committing to an early deadline by the students’
grade on their earlier assignment. Moreover, Figure 3
shows that neither the committed nor the noncom-
mitted exhibited any significant change in average
grade between the earlier and the current assignment,
even though those who committed appear to have
increased the spread in their grades.
Table 4. Failure to comply with the early, soft deadline.
Linear probability model Probit (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gender 0.168* 0.162* 0.192* 0.156* 0.160* 0.196**
(0.093) (0.097) (0.101) (0.085) (0.084) (0.086)
Parent with degree 0.203** 0.146 0.183 0.175** 0.122 0.159*
(0.093) (0.106) (0.110) (0.077) (0.089) (0.091)
Previous grade −0.008* −0.007 −0.007 −0.017*** −0.016*** −0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Expected hours 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Confidence −0.049 −0.025 −0.049 0.043 −0.039 −0.039
(0.261) (0.270) (0.280) (0.290) (0.293) (0.318)
Extroversion/open 0.088 0.093* 0.094** 0.100**
(0.053) (0.055) (0.044) (0.046)
Emotionally stable/conscientious −0.080 −0.059 −0.102** −0.088
(0.057) (0.061) (0.050) (0.053)
Agreeableness −0.010 −0.020 −0.030 −0.041
(0.055) (0.057) (0.050) (0.051)
Medium willingness to take risk 0.053 0.074
(0.106) (0.097)
Impatience (dummy) 0.118 0.092
(0.205) (0.179)
Other demographics and cohort Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 96 92 89 96 92 89
Notes: SEs in parentheses.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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Figure 2. Grade distribution for treated and untreated cohorts.
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Figure 3. Grade distribution by commitment status.
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Compliance with the official deadline
The fraction of students breaking the official dead-
line is slightly lower in the untreated cohorts than in
the treated ones, but the difference is not significant.
Similarly, the fraction of committed students break-
ing the official deadline is bigger than the corre-
sponding fraction of uncommitted students, but the
difference is not significant.
IV. Conclusion
This article has presented a study aimed at
exploring the demand for soft, self-imposed,
deadline-based commitment and subsequent
compliance behaviour. We find a substantial
demand for soft commitment, but the commit-
ment chosen is weak, and the failure to comply
with the chosen commitment is remarkably high.
Students are more likely to demand soft commit-
ment if they expect to work on the task more
hours and to perform worse than their peers.
They are more likely to break the chosen com-
mitment if they got a lower grade in the previous
assignment, are more open/extrovert and less
emotionally stable/conscientious.
Our findings raise two important, yet unan-
swered, questions that future research may
address. First, in order to design more effective
commitment devices, it is necessary to understand
why people do not comply with soft commitment.
In particular, is the failure to comply mainly dri-
ven by unexpected events or by a deviation from
full sophistication? Second, it is crucial to under-
stand whether soft commitment is beneficial even
when broken. In the context of deadline-based
commitment, can self-imposing an early deadline
induce a more efficient effort allocation, and thus
a better performance, even when people fail to
comply with the self-chosen deadline?
Understanding the latter would help to evaluate
the welfare effects of soft commitment, and com-
pare them with the welfare effects of hard commit-
ment. We hope that future research will build on
our study’s findings and investigate these policy
relevant, open questions.
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